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Abstract 
This study explores buyers’ search and purchase behavior in an information-overloaded retail 
Electronic Marketplace (EMP). Two instrumental variables, i.e. number of visitors and number of 
sales for an item, are used to represent buyers’ search and purchase behavior. Price and reputation, 
two of the most frequently researched independent variables in EMP studies, are considered. The 
relationships between the two IVs and the two DVs are verified when transaction items are of search-
type and of experience-type. This study is conducted using field data collected from Taobao (the most 
dominant retail EMP in China). It is found that reputation has consistent positive relationships with 
two DVs. Price has negative effects on two DVs. However, it might have no impacts in the case of 
experience-type items. Conclusively, in information overloaded EMP, reputation always matters in 
influencing buyers’ search and purchase behavior, while price only matters in the case of search-type 
items. 
Keywords: Electronic marketplace, reputation, price, information overload, buyers’ behavior. 
 
1 INTRODUCTION 
Electronic Marketplace (EMP) is independently owned, IT-enabled intermediary information system 
which connect many buyers and sellers (Soh, Markus and Goh 2006). In recent years, EMPs have 
grown rapidly and formed marvelous giant marketplaces. For example, eBay, the most famous global 
EMP, has approximately 276 million registered users worldwide. These users have posted a total 
number of 637 million new listings in the 4th quarter of 2007, i.e., averagely 6.7 million listings per 
day1. In China, with an annual sale of RMB43.3 billion in the year of 2007, the dominant retail 
EMP—Taobao, defeated even the sum of local Carrefour and Wal-Mart and became the 2nd largest 
marketplace2. 
While the dramatically huge EMPs excite buyers by offering them abundant options, not surprisingly, 
they simultaneously make these options being too many to choose from. To help buyers locate their 
                                              
1
 http://news.ebay.com/fastfacts_ebay_marketplace.cfm, available on 12-Mar-2008 
2
 http://forum.taobao.com/forum-14/show_thread----13526587-.htm, available on 25-Feb-2008 
desired item, EMPs usually offer detailed item catalogs and powerful search engines. Even though, 
buyers still can find hundreds or thousands of items when search from EMPs. For example, more than 
2000 items were found for Apple i phone in “phones w/o service contracts” category on eBay, and 
more than 6000 items were found for Nokia N73 phone in “cell phone > Nokia > N73” category on 
Taobao3. When searching by a relatively “broad” keyword, the number of listings we can get is 
unbelievable. Generally, it is possible for buyers to be “rational” (i.e., to compare all the listed items 
and choose the one with highest expected utility) when there are a handful of items in the list. 
However, when facing thousands of items in a list, what will buyers behave? Out of the thousands 
items, what kinds of items will be “lucky” enough to be viewed or even purchased? 
Based on the previous consideration, we propose our research question as, “in an information 
overloaded EMP, how will buyers’ search and purchase their desired item?” In other words, what kind 
of items will buyers click-in and view, and what kind of items will they purchase? Literature in 
electronic commerce and reputation systems suggests that price and reputation are two of the most 
important factors influencing buyer’s search and purchase behavior (Brynjolfsson and Smith 2000; 
Resnick et al. 2006; Yoo, Ho and Tam 2006; Baker and Song 2007). Following these suggestions, we 
focus on the impacts of price and reputation in this study. Specially, since existing research mostly 
examined the effects of reputation in auction EMP, we choose retail EMP as our research setting to 
extend the existing understanding of different types of EMPs. Furthermore, we also consider two types 
of items (i.e., search-type items and experience-type items), because it is illustrated in literature that 
the relationships between reputation, price and buyers’ behavior are different for these two types of 
items (Nelson 1970; Smith 1990; Aggarwal and Vaidyanathan 2003; Hsieh, Chiu and Chiang 2005). 
Examining the impacts of price and reputation on buyers’ search and purchase behavior in information 
overloaded retail EMP is meaningful, both from academic and practical perspective. Academically, 
this study can benefit to the understandings of buyers’ behavior in information overloaded situations, 
and also can contribute to the stream of reputation system research literature. Moreover, our study can 
offer some cues to research on buyer’s choice model when given a mass of information. From a 
practical perspective, the result of this study can give some suggestions to the design of EMP search 
engine, recommending agency, and the display mechanism of listings and items. For sellers, our 
research findings could also be beneficial in helping them decide their pricing and other marketing 
strategies. 
The plan of this paper is as follows. Section 2 reviews related research studies and analyzes our 
research questions from a theoretical perspective. Based on this review and analysis, research 
hypotheses are proposed. Section 3 introduces our methodology, including field data collecting from 
Taobao, descriptive analysis of each variable and regression models. Section 4 presents our research 
results. Then these research findings are discussed in Section 5, including some remarks on 
implications, limitations and future research. In the end of this paper, a general conclusion is given. 
2 THEORETICAL CONSIDERATIONS 
2.1 EMP and “information overload” 
EMP offers a platform (i.e., information systems) to participants where they can exchange product 
offerings and prices information, and also transact with each other. Two characteristics make EMP 
inevitably becoming “overloaded”. First, inventory in EMP is distributively held by all the sellers. 
EMP itself does not hold any inventory. This distributive nature of inventory allows EMP to have 
massive content storage and almost infinite number of listings (Zhang 2006). Second, transaction costs 
                                              
3
 2345 items found for Apple™ i phone in “Phones w/o Service Contracts” on eBay™; 6025 items found for Nokia™ N73 
phone in “Cell Phones > Nokia > N73” on Taobao™. Search conducted at 23:00 p.m. on 11-Mar-2008. 
in EMP are very low, especially for sellers. Any ordinary participants can post lists of their own items, 
to perhaps millions of potentially interested buyers, without setting up a “brick-and-mortar” storefront 
and paying a large fee incurred in transactions (Zhang 2006). Besides, updating information in EMP is 
also convenient and instantaneous. Due to the above reasons, it is very attractive for sellers to post 
their listings in EMP. These characteristic generates impetus to growing of listings. 
As coined by Alvin Toffler (1970), “information overload” refers to the state of having too much 
information to make a decision or remain informed about a topic. When a buyer faces thousands of 
items in a list, it seems he/she is involved in an “information overload” problem. However, the 
situation is even worse in EMP: when information on listings is overloaded, information on quality is 
lacked. In EMP, most of the conventional quality cues in shopping (e.g. observing storefront, talking 
with clerks and inspecting items through touch and feel) are not available (Andrews and Benzing 
2007). The absent of conventional quality cues encumber buyers in collecting sufficient information 
on their desired items, and thus involve them into even more difficulties in making a purchase 
decision. 
Conclusively, buyers demand appropriate amount of listings information and thorough quality 
information to make purchase decisions, while the information supplied in EMP is always contrary 
(overloaded in listings and lacked in quality). To locate and purchase their desired items in the 
overloaded listings, buyers can use several strategies. One most useful strategy is to narrow down their 
options according to some criteria, and then selectively view some items. Intuitively, the criteria which 
buyers will consider in purchasing commonly will be price and quality. Empirical studies of online 
auctions have found that quality can be signaled by seller’s reputation (Melnik and Alm 2005; 
Dewally and Ederington 2006; Josang, Ismail and Boyd 2007). Research in electronic commerce and 
reputation systems also has demostrated that reputation and price are two of the most important factors 
influencing buyer’s search and purchase behavior (Brynjolfsson and Smith 2000; Resnick et al. 2006; 
Yoo et al. 2006; Baker and Song 2007). Therefore, we will choose reputation and price as our 
interested factors. 
2.2 Reputation and price 
Reputation system is commonly used in EMP to signal quality (Josang et al. 2007). For example, eBay 
adopted a reputation system (named as “feedback forum”) to reveal participant’s transaction and 
feedback history. After each transaction, participants involved in the transaction are encouraged to 
rating the behavior of their counter-partners as “1” (positive), “0” (neutral) or “-1” (negative). 
Reputation score is accumulated based on these ratings. Empirical studies have illustrated that high 
reputation score can help sellers in attracting more bidders, enhancing the rate of successful 
transactions, and generating price premiums (Ba and Pavlou 2002; Houser and Wooders 2006; 
Resnick et al. 2006; Zhang 2006). According to game theory, when stimulated by the long-term 
benefits generated by high reputation, sellers with high reputation score will not seize short-term 
benefit by delivering low quality items (Dellarocas 2003). Therefore, high reputation score can “softly 
guarantee” high item quality and seller honesty. Considering these quality issues, when buyers intend 
to narrow down their options of listings, they can prefer items from high reputation sellers. 
Another criterion for narrowing down a buyer’s options is price. Price in online retailing is given by 
sellers before transaction (similar to the “Buy-It-Now” price in online auctions). Suppose two items 
which have exactly the same quality and different prices. Obviously, the item with lower price can 
generate higher utility for buyers. Hence, when quality is similar, items with low price will attract 
more buyers. Without considering quality issues, buyers can prefer items with low price to narrow 
down their listings options. 
Conclusively, the criteria chosen by buyers in narrowing down their listings options are contingent on 
whether they have to consider quality problems. In searching and purchasing different types of items, 
the importance of quality issues is different. In the following subsection, we will discuss two types of 
items: search-type and experience-type items. This classification method is classical (Nelson 1970; 
Nelson 1974) and frequently researched in electronic commerce (Aggarwal and Vaidyanathan 2003; 
Hsieh et al. 2005). 
2.3 Search-type and experience-type items 
Search-type and experience-type items were firstly differentiated by Nelson in his seminal work on 
economics of information and advertising (Nelson 1970; Nelson 1974). Search-type items are items 
with full information of dominant attributes can be acquired prior to purchase, while experience-type 
items are items with dominant attributes which can only be known after purchase and use (Nelson 
1970; Nelson 1974; Klein 1998). In retail EMP, collecting item information before purchase mainly 
relies on item descriptions, pictures and other electronic cues online. Items with such kinds of 
attributes as dominant attributes are search-type items, for example, cell phones, mp3 players and 
other consumer electronics. Contrarily, items with dominant attributes which can not be easily 
described on webpage are experience-type items. For example, style and fitness of clothes, which 
requires firsthand experiences (i.e., observation and interaction experiences) in shop, can not easily be 
illustrated in EMP. Items with such kinds of attributes as dominant attributes are experience-type 
items. 
For search-type items, buyers can collect dominant attributes information from descriptions online, 
while for experience-type items, buyers can only know the quality after receipt of items. Simply, when 
searching and purchasing different types of items, buyers will pay different extent of attention on 
quality and price information. We will discuss this in the following subsection. 
2.4 EMP and information overload 
As discussed previously, to search appropriate items from overloaded listings, buyers have to quickly 
narrow down their options. In the case of searching a search-type item, since the item information of 
dominant attributes are explicitly expressed online, the quality related risk is much less than in the 
case of an experience-type item. Because the quality of search-type item is obvious and consistent, 
seller’s reputation may be less useful in such a case. Therefore, buyers will pay more attention to price 
information, and quickly narrow down their options by price. Conversely, in the case of searching an 
experience-type item, buyers can not observe item quality directly. It is meaningless for buyers to find 
a cheap item in unknown quality conditions, because the uncertainty of quality sharply decreased 
his/her expected utility. Thus, in such cases, buyers will prefer reputation than price as the criterion in 
narrowing down their options. 
Based on these discussions, we hypothesize: 
H1a: Price has negative relationship with the number of visitors. 
H1b: Price has stronger relationship with the number of visitors in the case of search-type items than 
experience-type items. 
H2a: Reputation has positive relationship with the number of visitors. 
H2b: Reputation has stronger relationship with the number of visitors in the case of experience-type 
items than search-type items. 
Buyers make their purchase decisions based on the items viewed. Compared with the information 
overloaded searching process, buyers have already narrowed down their options before they decide 
which item to purchase. In such conditions, buyers can be “rational”, i.e., compare the price and 
quality of each item, and choose the one with highest utility. In other words, given the number of 
visitors for an item, both low price and high quality can increase sale. Similar to the discussion in the 
previous paragraph, buyers have to pay attention to the quality issues in the case of experience-type 
items than search-type items. Therefore, reputation should be a more important factor in the case of 
experience-type items, while price should be more important in the case of search-type items. Hence, 
we hypothesize: 
H3a: Price has negative relationship with the number of sales. 
H3b: Price has stronger relationship with the number of sales in the case of search-type items than 
experience-type items. 
H4a: Reputation has positive significant relationship with the number of sales. 
H4b: Reputation has stronger relationship with the number of sales in the case of experience-type 
items than search-type items. 
These hypotheses will be verified using field data collected from Taobao in the following sections. 
3 METHODOLOGY 
3.1 Taobao and data collection 
Field data collected from Taobao were used in verifying our hypotheses. We chose Taobao as our data 
source for several reasons. First, Taobao is the most dominant retail EMP in China. It has more than 
55 million registered users. Buyers’ behavior on Taobao is very representative. Second, Taobao offers 
powerful search engines and detailed catalogs in helping buyers locate their desired items. Third, 
buyers can reorder their search result listings by price and reputation, which are the most important 
variables in our study. 
“Nokia N73” cell phone and “female suits” were selected as search-type and experience-type items. 
Using the catalog information, we excluded all the items which are essentially not what we desired, for 
example, accessories for “Nokia N73” cell phone. We used these two types of items because they are 
frequently searched items in Taobao. Furthermore, the amount of listings of these two types of items 
was also representative in Taobao. 
3.2 Variables 
A self-developed spider program was used in capturing data from Taobao on 7-March-2008. We have 
collected 3241 listings of “Nokia N73” and 2285 listings of “female suits”. At the first step, we 
collected information of all the listings. From the listings, we have collected item id, item name and 
item price (Price). After the first step, our spider program “clicked into” each item description page. 
From each item description page, we have collected the number of hours since the item was posted 
(CurrTerm), number of visitors (CurrVisit) and number of sales (CurrSale) in this period of time, the 
seller’s reputation score (RpSeller) and percentage of positive ratings (RpPercSeller). As suggested in 
several empirical studies (Livingston 2005; Melnik and Alm 2005), reputation has a decreasing 
marginal effect, thus we use the nature logarithm of RpSeller plus 1 (i.e., log(RpSeller+1)) to represent 
sellers’ reputation. Before conducting any analysis, we removed 5 listings in the “Nokia N73” case 
and 2 listings in the “female suits” case, for the data of these 7 listings are extremely abnormal. 
Therefore, we have totally 5519 data points, including 3236 of “Nokia N73” and 2283 of “female 
suits”, in the data analysis process. The variables we collected are described in table 1. A simple 
descriptive analysis of these two groups of data is illustrated in Table 2. 
3.3 Models 
We used hierarchical regression analysis in testing the hypotheses (Kutner et al. 2004).  Hierarchical 
regression method has been widely used in testing both main effects and interaction effects (Stock and 
Tatikonda 2008). In this study, we firstly included the control variables in the regression equations, 
and then we added the price and reputation variables sequentially, in the purpose of testing main 
effects (H1a, H2a, H3a and H4a). In a further step, we added the interaction term of product type and 
main effects variables into the regression equations. Through this step, we verified the moderating 
effect of product type (H1b, H2b, H3b and H4b). We also examined the changed variance (changed 
adjusted R2) explained by the variable(s) added in each step, to evaluate the effect of each variable we 
interested in. 
 
Variables Descriptions 
DSearch is a dummy variable; equals to 1 when the item is search type, or 0 when the item is 
experience type. 
CurrTerm equals to number of hours since the item was posted. 
Price is price of item given by its seller. 
RpSeller is seller’s accumulated reputation score; equals to number of positive ratings minus 
negative ratings; only counts ratings posted by buyers. 
RpPercSeller is seller’s percentage of positive ratings. 
CurrVisit equals to number of visitors who have visit the item description page since the item 
was posted. 
CurrSale equals to number of sales since the item was posted. 
Table 1. Descriptions of variables 
 
  Mean  Median 
 
Maximum 
 
Minimum  Std. Dev. 
CurrSale 0.080 0 15 0 0.548 
CurrTerm 109.603 96 336 0 77.439 
CurrVisit 10.485 2 1243 0 47.928 
DSearch 0.586 1 1 0 0.493 
Price 1456.470 2058 4990 5 1033.314 
RpSeller 468.347 47 48073 0 1744.849 
RpPercSeller 86.085 100 100 0 33.814 
Sample size is 5519. 
Table 2. Descriptive analysis of variables 
Because the dependent variables in our study are count variables, we used Poisson Regression Model 
in analyzing the data (Greene 2008). Poisson regression model is used in the situation when dependent 
variable is a discrete variable, which in most cases will equals zero, and in other cases will takes a 
positive value. The typical values of such a variable are zero, one, or two, but much higher values are 
also possible (Greene 2008). Researchers already have adopted Poisson Regression Model in 
examining the relationship between reputation and number of bidders, which is also a count variable 
(Ruiz 2004). 
We used the following equation (equation 1) as the full model in analyzing the relationship between 
number of visitors and the independent variables we are interested in. Equations V1~V5 (see Table3) 
are derived from this model, by removing some variable(s). 
CurrVisit = C(1) + C(2)*DSsearch + C(3)*CurrTerm + C(4)*Price + C(5)*Log(RpSeller+1) 
 + C(6)*RpPercSeller + C(7)*DSearch*Price + C(8)*DSearch*Log(RpSeller+1)                       (1) 
The regression coefficient of Price was used in verifying H1a, while regression coefficient of 
Log(RpSeller+1) was used in verifying H2a. Moreover, the regression coefficients of two interaction 
terms were used in verifying H1b and H2b. Besides our interested independent variables (i.e., Price 
and RpSeller) and interaction terms, we included three control variables (i.e., DSearch, CurrTerm and 
RpPercSeller). We expected the regression coefficient of DSearch to be positive, because the EMP is 
of higher risks for purchasing experience-type items, and buyers will be more intended to view and 
purchase search-type items in EMP. We also expected the regression coefficient of CurrTerm to be 
positive. Intuitively, the longer after an item is posted, the more visitors will be attracted. We had no 
expectation on the regression coefficient of RpPercSeller, because before “click in” each listing, buyers 
generally do not know its seller’s percentage of positive ratings. 
The following equation (equation 2) is used as the full model in analyzing the relationship between 
number of sales and the independent variables. Equations S1~S6 (see Table4) are derived from this 
model, by removing some variable(s). 
CurrSale = C(1) + C(2)*DSsearch + C(3)*CurrTerm + C(4)*CurrVisit + C(5)*Price + C(6)*Log(RpSeller+1) 
 + C(7)*RpPercSeller + C(8)*DSearch*Price + C(9)*DSearch*Log(RpSeller+1)                        (2) 
Similar to equation 1, we used the regression coefficients of Price and Log(RpSeller+1) in testing the 
main effects (i.e., H3a and H4a), and used the regression coefficients of interaction terms in testing the 
moderating effects of item type (i.e., H3b and H4b). Compared to equation 1, we included one more 
control variable (CurrVisit) in this equation. Generally, buyers have to firstly visit and verify an item 
before they decide whether to purchase, thus CurrVisit will have positive impacts on CurrSale. The 
expectations of control variables’ regression coefficients are similar to equation 1, except RpPercSeller. 
When buyers have already viewed the item description page, they have known the percentage of 
positive ratings of its seller. Obviously, the higher percentage of positive ratings is, the less risk will be 
involved in purchase. We expected the regression coefficient to be positive. 
We used EViews 6 in conducting the regressions. EViews 6 is a powerful statistical tool in handling 
Poisson Regression Models. The research results are reported in the next section. 
4 RESULTS 
The regression results are illustrated in Table 3 and Table 4. Table 3 shows the five equations (V1~V5) 
generated from equation 1, while Table 4 shows the six equations (S1~S5) of equation 2. Each column 
except the first one, in the two tables, represents one individual equation. We have reported the 
regression coefficients and their corresponding significance level in each equation, and also R2, 
adjusted R2, and changed adjusted R2 (comparing with the equation in previous column). 
In Table 3, we observed significant negative regression coefficients between price and number of 
visitors (in equations V2~V4), except the regression coefficient in the equation with interaction term 
(in equation V5). The coefficient of interaction term of DSearch (item type) and Price is negative, 
which means the effects of price is larger (more negative) in the case of search-type item than in the 
case of experience-type item. Therefore, H1b is supported. Considering the significantly zero 
coefficient of Price in the equation V5, it is possible that, in the case of experience-type items, Price 
has no effect on number of visitors, while in the case of search-type items, price has significantly 
negative effect. Based on these considerations, we concluded that, H1a is partially supported by our 
data, and H1b is supported. 
We also observed consistently significant positive relationship between Log(RpSeller+1) and number 
of visitors (in equation V3~V5). Thus, H2a is supported. However, opposite to our hypothesis 2b, we 
observed a significantly positive relationship between the interaction term of DSearch and 
Log(RpSeller+1). The positive coefficient means the effect of reputation on number of visitors in the 
case of search-type items is larger than in the case of experience-type items. Therefore, H2b is rejected. 
  (V1) (V2) (V3) (V4) (V5) 
C 1.753*** 2.271*** -0.143*** 0.358*** 0.121*** 
DSearch 0.260*** 6.322*** 5.830*** 5.846*** 10.851*** 
CurrTerm 0.004*** 0.004*** 0.006*** 0.006*** 0.006*** 
Price  -0.003*** -0.003*** -0.003*** 0.000*** 
Log(RpSeller+1)   0.395*** 0.422*** 0.371*** 
RpPercSeller    -0.007*** -0.008*** 
DSearch*Price     -0.005*** 
DSearch*Log(RPSeller+1)     0.053*** 
      
R2 0.004  0.033  0.129  0.133  0.133  
Adjusted R2 0.004  0.033  0.128  0.132  0.132  
∆ Adjusted R2 0.004  0.028  0.096  0.004  0.000  
Dependent variable is CurrVisit. Sample size is 5519. Poisson regression model has been used. 
* Significant at the 0.1 level; 
** Significant at the 0.05 level;  
*** Significant at the 0.01 level. 
Table 3. Regression Results 
 
 (S1) (S2) (S3) (S4) (S5) (S6) 
C -3.170*** -3.209*** -2.856*** -4.599*** -5.233*** -6.275*** 
DSearch 0.521*** 0.397*** 4.165*** 4.876*** 4.806*** 9.119*** 
CurrTerm 0.003*** 0.002*** 0.002*** 0.004*** 0.004*** 0.004*** 
CurrVisit  0.005*** 0.005*** 0.004*** 0.004*** 0.003*** 
Price   -0.002*** -0.002*** -0.002*** 0.000       
Log(RpSeller+1)    0.318*** 0.299*** 0.383*** 
RpPercSeller     0.007*     0.007*     
DSearch*Price      -0.004*** 
DSearch*Log(RPSeller+1)      -0.097*     
       
df       
R2 0.002  0.028  0.013  0.106  0.110  0.134  
Adjusted R2 0.002  0.027  0.012  0.105  0.109  0.132  
∆ Adjusted R2 0.002  0.025  -0.015  0.093  0.004  0.023  
Dependent variable is CurrSale. Sample size is 5519. Poisson regression model has been used. 
* Significant at the 0.1 level; 
** Significant at the 0.05 level;  
*** Significant at the 0.01 level. 
Table 4. Regression Results 
Table 4 demonstrated the regression results of equations developed from equation 2. According to our 
hypothesis H3a, the regression coefficients of Price should be significantly negative. Similar to Table 
3, we observed three significantly negative coefficients and one insignificant zero. The coefficients of 
interaction term of DSearch and Price is also significantly negative, which means Price have more 
effects on number of sales in the case of search-type items than experience-type items. Therefore, we 
concluded that H3b is supported, while H3a is partially supported, because it is possible that Price 
have not effects on the number of sales in the case of experience-type items. Table 4 also reported 
consistently significant positive relationship between Log(RpSeller+1) and number of sales (in 
equation S4~S6), and significantly (p<0.1) negative relationship between the interaction term of 
DSearch and Log(RpSeller+1). The negative coefficient means the effect of reputation on number of 
sales in the case of experience-type items is larger than in the case of search-type items. Accordingly, 
we concluded that H4a is supported, and H4b is weakly supported. 
We summarized all the hypotheses and research results in table 5. Totally, of the eight hypotheses, 
four are fully supported, three are partially or weakly supported, and one is rejected. Discussions, 
including implications and limitations of our study will be presented in the next section, and hints on 
future research are also proposed. 
 
Hypotheses DV IV Hypothesized relationship Hypothesis Supported? 
H1a number of visitors price - Partially Supported 
H1b number of visitors price Search type> Experience type* Yes 
H2a number of visitors reputation + Yes 
H2b number of visitors reputation Experience type > Search type* No 
H3a number of sales price - Partially Supported 
H3b number of sales price Search type> Experience type* Yes 
H4a number of sales reputation + Yes 
H4b number of sales reputation Experience type > Search type* Weakly Supported 
* is the comparison of effect sizes (without considering directions) in the two cases. 
Table 5. Summarization of hypotheses and findings 
5 DISCUSSION 
5.1 Implications 
One of the most important implications of our study has to do with buyers’ behavior when they face 
overloaded information in retail EMP. As we illustrated previously, contemporary EMPs have already 
become marvelously huge. However, researchers merely consider the situation of information 
overload. Using two instrumental variables (number of visitors and number of sales), we examined 
buyers’ search and purchase behavior in an information overloaded situation. Moreover, we 
distinguished the type of items, and researched its moderating effect on these relationships. The 
research findings clearly demonstrated that buyers will selectively view and purchase items from high 
reputation sellers. They are also inclined to search and purchase low price items in the case of search-
type items. However, price may not be an important factor in influencing both buyers’ search and 
purchase behavior in the case of experience-type items. Knowledge on the important criteria by which 
buyers narrow down their options and make purchase decisions can give some hints on the design of 
search engines (Berghel 1997), information agency (Berghel 1997) and recommendation agents 
(Aggarwal and Vaidyanathan 2003). The design of information searching and recommendation 
mechanisms in EMP platform is meaningful from both from theoretical and practical perspective. A 
well designed EMP platform can increase users’ perceived usability and usefulness of EMP, thus will 
attract more users to join (Gefen, Karahanna and Straub 2003). Furthermore, although this particular 
study focuses on buyers’ behavior in information overloaded retail EMP, it also gives some hints on 
research in the cases of auction EMP. In auction EMP, research questions could probably similar: 
what kind of factors will influence buyer’s search and bidding behavior when they face hundreds or 
thousands of auctions? Are these relationships contingent on item type? We expect the effect of 
reputation will still be significant, but the effects of price (which could be start bid or current highest 
bid) should be reconsidered. 
The second implication of our study is that we verified the effects of reputation system in the 
circumstance of retail EMP. Reputation is expected to have positive relationships with transaction 
outcomes theoretically (Dellarocas 2003), but empirical studies have found some mixed results (Wan 
and Teo 2001; Eaton 2002; Gilkeson and Reynolds 2003; Zhang 2006). Most of these empirical 
studies focused on auction EMPs, especially eBay. Effects of reputation in other settings are seldom 
examined. In this study, we tested the effect of reputation using data collected from Taobao, which is a 
retail EMP in China, and found consistent positive impacts of reputation on both number of visitors 
and number of sales. Therefore, our findings affirmed the theoretical expectation of the positive effects 
of reputation from a different perspective. 
The third implication of this research is related to the understandings on effects of price and pricing 
strategy. Price is given before purchase in retail EMP, rather than decided by bidders in auction EMP. 
According to economic theories, a cost occurs when a seller want to develop a high reputation, thus 
the seller will try to seize price premium as payback (Dellarocas 2003). However, in retail EMP, if 
sellers try to charge a high price, they may lose some potential buyers; and this effect is contingent on 
the type of items they sell. In other words, a high price strategy will be more effective when sellers are 
selling experience-type items rather than search-type items. Our study sheds some lights on studies 
related to seller’s pricing behavior online. Practically, sellers can utilize our findings when they sell 
different types of items. For example, if they sell search-type items, they can moderately charge a low 
price to attract buyers; but when they sell experience-type items, since buyers are not sensitive to price, 
they can charge a price premium as their payback of investment on reputation. 
5.2 Limitations and future research 
There are several limitations in this study. First, in the information overload situation, say, facing 
thousands of listings, buyers can only view a little portion of these listings. The most commonly 
happened situation is, buyers reorder the listings by their interested criteria, and only view the first 
several pages. To attract more buyers, experienced sellers will pay more attention on the description 
(such as include discount information in the item title) of items in listings. A carefully designed listing 
will possibly increase buyers’ desire of “click in” (GE, TEO and LEE 2002). Experienced sellers may 
also have other special methods in attracting buyers to “click in”. These special methods could be 
advertisements on some online forums, auto item recommendations and customer relationships 
management through “Wangwang”4 (Ou and Davison 2007). These omitted variables might be the 
reason why the power of our model is relatively small. Further study should include these omitted 
variables, such as the additional options in the listings (GE et al. 2002), description of items, pictures, 
escrow service and payment choice (Baker and Song 2007). Especially, IM tools combined with EMP 
(e.g., Wangwang on Taobao, Skype on eBay) can help in managing customer relationships (Ou and 
Davison 2007), and even attracting and making deals. Examining the effects of IM tools on buyers’ 
behavior could also be an interesting topic in future. 
Second, other than item price and quality, buyers may also consider sellers’ trustworthiness and 
service quality when they searching for items. For example, they probably will consider whether seller 
                                              
4
 An IM tool combined with Taobao retail EMP. 
will carefully pack and quickly deliver the item. Because reputation is correlated with seller’s 
experience (McDonald and Slawson 2002), reputation score is not only a signal of seller honesty, but 
also a signal of seller’s service ability. Buyers may probably be more intent to purchase from 
experience sellers for their nice service quality. Future research should try to distinguish seller 
trustworthiness and item quality, and study the relationship between reputation and these two 
constructs individually. 
Third, since quality of experience-type items is unknown before purchase and use, it is unavoidable 
that such kinds of items have various values. Contrarily, search-type items are more likely to have 
consistent quality and value. We used “female suits” to represent experience-type items and “Nokia 
N73” to represent search-type items. Unavoidably, two questions remained related to the data. Firstly, 
using “female suits” and “Nokia N73” to represent experience-type items and search-type items is 
relatively subjective. Secondly, the listings of “Nokia N73” have relatively less variance on price 
while the listings of “female suites” have more variance on price. Future study should collect more 
data, and verify the hypotheses in more situations. Besides, gender could also be one reason of the 
observed different behaviors, because a majority of the visitors and buyers of “Nokia N73” should be 
male, while visitors and buyers of “female suites” should always be female. Future research also 
should consider this problem. 
6 CONCLUSION 
The purpose of our study is to explore buyers’ search and purchase behavior in an information-
overloaded retail EMP. We focus on the effects of two commonly researched variables (i.e., price and 
reputation) when items are of different types (i.e., search-type and experience-type). Using field data 
collected from Taobao, we find that reputation always matters in influencing buyers’ search and 
purchase behavior, while price only does in the case of search-type items. 
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